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On March 3, 2000, Russia declared the official end of thesecond war in Chechnya, the first of which occurredfrom 1994–1996. Yet one year later, the Russian military
continues to carry out its campaign against Chechen indepen-
dence with brutality. The war in Chechnya has cost thousands of
lives, displaced thousands more, and has severely damaged the
republic’s infrastructure. As was the case during the first war, dur-
ing the second Chechen conflict the Russian military has per-
petrated horrors upon the civilian population in Chechnya—from
torture and beatings in notorious “filtration camps” to indis-
criminate shelling and bombings, forced repatriation, and arbi-
trary detention and arrest. 
Russia is a member of the Council of Europe, a State Party to
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (European Convention), a State Party to the Geneva
Conventions, and a signatory to the
Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide. Accordingly, Russia is obligated
to respect human rights and human-
itarian law guaranteed by these instru-
ments. Russia’s military offensive in
Chechnya has resulted in blatant vio-
lations of these international legal
obligations. 
Thus far, the Russian legal system
has proven to be ineffective in bring-
ing about accountability for Russia’s human rights and human-
itarian law violations in Chechnya. Equally disturbing is the inter-
national community’s failure to demand accountability from
Russia. Fear of angering and antagonizing Russia has all but par-
alyzed the international community, as evidenced in part by its
failure to demand Russian compliance with a UN Commission on
Human Rights resolution condemning the atrocities in Chech-
nya. Consequently, Russia has been able to violate international
human rights and humanitarian law with impunity. Yet there are
other mechanisms available for pursuing justice in Chechnya. For
instance, the UN Security Council might establish an international
criminal tribunal for Chechnya akin to the international crimi-
nal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Additionally,
the UN could establish an international commission of inquiry
or prosecute Russia before the International Court of Justice. Out-
side the UN system, the European community might bring an
inter-state complaint against Russia before the European Court
of Human Rights. 
Historical Background
The self-proclaimed Chechen Republic lies in the northern
Caucasus region—bordered by Russia to the north and Georgia
and Azerbaijan to the south—and is home to nearly one million
Chechens. During the Stalinist era (1924–1953), Chechens, along
with other minority groups, were deported to Central Asia and
Siberia. In the late 1950s, Soviet authorities permitted Chechens
to return to their homeland. Having been deprived of their land
and economic resources, for decades the Chechens sought inde-
pendence from the Soviet Union and, after it dissolved, from the
Russian Federation. 
In December 1994, Russian troops invaded the separatist
Chechen Republic. Three factors supported the invasion: Chech-
nya’s vast oil resources and the presence of oil pipelines on its ter-
ritory, Chechnya’s strategic location in the Caucasus mountains,
and the fear that permitting Chechnya’s secession would set a
precedent for other republics to secede. Two years of bitter fight-
ing ensued. By August 1996, Aslan Maskhadov, the leader of the
Chechen rebel forces, and Russian General Alexander Lebed
negotiated an agreement providing for a withdrawal of Russian
troops. The agreement notably postponed a decision on Chech-
nya’s constitutional status until 2001. The following winter,
Maskhadov won the presidential elections and became presi-
dent of Chechnya’s separatist government. Six months into his
presidency, Maskhadov and then Russian president Boris Yeltsin
signed a formal peace treaty ceasing the Russian offensive in
Chechnya, officially ending the first war. While the peace treaty
left open the question of Chechnya’s independence, Russia
agreed to abide by norms of international law and not exercise
force to settle disputes. In the ensuing years, Chechnya has
existed under a de facto independence. 
By August 1999, the Chechen con-
flict was re-ignited. The renewed
fighting was in part a response to
Chechen aggression in neighboring
Dagestan and in part to a series of
bombings in Moscow and other Russ-
ian cities, which the Russian govern-
ment blamed on Chechen separatists.
On September 15, 1999, CNN’s
Moscow Bureau reported that dozens
of suspects and stockpiles of explo-
sives had been seized in connection
with the bombings. Having won the presidency largely because
of his opposition to Chechen independence, Russian President
Vladimir Putin has consistently sought to validate Russia’s pres-
ence in Chechnya by labeling it an “anti-terrorist operation [that]
must be followed through to the end.”
Violations of Humanitarian Law
The war in Chechnya is characterized by egregious violations
of international humanitarian law. The Russian military has per-
petrated violent crimes upon the civilian population in Chech-
nya, including mass killings, deliberate and indiscriminate shelling
and bombing of civilian areas, arbitrary arrest and detention, tor-
ture and beatings, systematic rape, and forced repatriation from
neighboring Ingushetia into the Chechen war zone. Exacerbat-
ing the already dangerous situation, Chechen fighters have used
civilians as human shields. Chechen forces also have summarily
executed Russian soldiers in contravention of humanitarian law.
According to numerous non-governmental organizations, how-
ever, Russian forces have committed the majority of abuses. 
Russian military tactics adhere to a pattern of directly target-
ing civilians. These tactics breach the requirement enumerated
in Article 48 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Con-
ventions. Article 48 provides that “[i]n order to ensure respect
for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects,
the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between
the civilian population and combatants and between civilian
objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their
operations only against military objectives.” As part of its campaign
in Chechnya, however, the Russian military has carried out three
large-scale civilian massacres. Through detailed interviews with
over 500 witnesses, Human Rights Watch documented these
massacres. In the village of Alkhan-Yurt, Russian troops killed 17
civilians during a looting spree and burned homes and raped sev-
eral women. In the Staropromyslovski district of Grozny, Russian
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soldiers have murdered more than 50 civilians since taking con-
trol of the district. In the Aldi district of Grozny, Russian forces
shot more than 60 civilians who were waiting in their streets and
yards for soldiers to check their resident documents. Addition-
ally, on October 29, 1999, a Russian air attack in the Ashkoy
Martan district hit a humanitarian convoy which, according to
Amnesty International, included vehicles clearly marked with
the Red Cross emblem. This particular attack violates Article 16
of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which stipulates the wounded
and sick are to be afforded “particular protection and respect,”
as well as Article 21, which explicitly states that vehicles convey-
ing the sick and wounded are to be respected and protected.
In its brutal campaign against Chechen separatists, the Russ-
ian military has concentrated on the civilian population in the
besieged Chechen capital of Grozny. In December 1999, Russian
aircrafts dropped leaflets over Grozny, warning civilians the Russ-
ian military would consider those remaining past December 11,
“terrorists and bandits [who] will be destroyed by artillery and avi-
ation.” The Russian military evidently showed no regard for
those who were too sick or frightened to leave, or simply had not
seen the leaflet. According to Amnesty International, even when
Chechens attempt to flee via “safe corridors,” Russian troops
continue to carry out direct attacks on civilians. Consequently, civil-
ians have effectively been trapped for months behind front lines.
The most egregious humanitarian law violations occur within
the detention centers known as “filtration camps.” Russian troops
often detain Chechens for not having proper registration papers
and a residence permit, or based on suspicion of being a separatist
fighter. Women and children often are detained on suspicion of
being related to a Chechen fighter. The Russian government has
used various tactics to conceal the existence of these detention cen-
ters. For instance, the Russian government temporarily removed
hundreds of detainees from the notorious Chernokosovo camp
during a visit from Council of Europe monitors. NGOs have
gleaned information about these camps from survivors. 
As reported by Amnesty International, upon arrival at the
“filtration camps,” detainees are forced to run through a gaunt-
let of guards who beat detainees with nightsticks, clubs, and
metal bars. Within these makeshift facilities, Chechen men,
women and children are routinely and systematically raped,
beaten, and brutally tortured with electric shocks and tear gas.
Often confessions of being a guerrilla fighter are extracted dur-
ing beatings and torture. Russian practices in these “filtration
camps” violate various provisions of the Geneva Conventions,
including Article 3(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which
prohibits violence to life and person, cruel treatment and torture,
and “outrages upon personal dignity.”
These acts by Russian forces in Chechnya constitute grave
human rights abuses and violate Russia’s humanitarian law oblig-
ations under the Geneva Conventions, which protect civilians and
other non-combatants during armed conflict. Pursuant to the Con-
ventions, Russia is obligated to focus attacks on combatants and
undertake safeguards to protect civilians. Moreover, Russia did
not invoke Article 15 of the European Convention, which provides
for a right of derogation of international humanitarian law and
permits partial limitation of civilian rights during war or a state
of emergency. By failing to secure the right of derogation, Rus-
sia has breached numerous provisions of the European Con-
vention, including Article 3, prohibiting torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, and Article 5, which protects
the right to life and security of person.
The Elusiveness of Accountability within the 
Russian Legal System
Russia has thus far failed to establish a meaningful account-
ability process. In addition to regular law enforcement agencies,
Russia established three bodies to deal with human rights abuses
in Chechnya—the Office of the Special Representative of the Pres-
ident of the Russian Federation for Ensuring Human and Civil
Rights and Freedoms in the Chechen Republic (Office of the Spe-
cial Representative); a purportedly independent national com-
mission, headed by former Justice Minister Krasheninikov; and
a State Duma Commission on Normalizing the Socio-Political Sit-
uation and Human Rights in Chechnya.
The inefficacy of these agencies largely is due to their limited
mandates. They can neither subpoena evidence or witnesses,
nor submit evidence to prosecutorial authorities. Further, the
agencies have not established cooperative relationships with
domestic prosecutorial agencies. The Office of the Special Rep-
resentative, however, has secured the release of many Chechen
detainees in Russian custody and has handled individual com-
plaints, placing emphasis on those involving food, housing, iden-
tity papers, and other necessities. Moreover, this agency has
established a cooperative working relationship with the Council
of Europe by permitting the deployment of three European
experts to assist with investigations. Yet the Office of the Special
Representative cannot investigate complaints of abuse by Russ-
ian forces, nor can it compel the prosecutorial authorities to
investigate allegations of abuse. Even more troubling is a rejec-
tion by the agency’s director that atrocities have occurred. In con-
trast, Aleksander Tukashov, head of the State Duma commission,
recently acknowledged Russia’s violations of international human-
itarian law during the two Chechen wars. Despite these acknowl-
edgments, procedural barriers have rendered the State Duma
commission equally ineffective in pursuing investigations and
prosecutions. A January 24, 2001, joint statement by human
rights organizations noted that the purportedly independent
national commission now appears to be defunct. 
Russian prosecutorial authorities and government ministries
also are inadequate. Following the massacre in the Aldi district
of Grozny, the Russian Ministry of Defense issued a denial: “These
assertions are nothing but a concoction not supported by fact or
any proof.” As reported in Novaya Gazeta, a Russian newspaper,
the Prosecutor’s Office received a strict order from Moscow to slow
down the investigation of the Aldi massacre and to cease dis-
tributing official documents confirming the massacre occurred
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to prevent victims’ families from presenting such documents as
evidence to international organizations.
The current inefficacy of the Russian domestic legal system
dates back to the aftermath of the first Chechen war, when Rus-
sia did not prosecute any of its military personnel for violations
of humanitarian law. According to the International Helsinki Fed-
eration, Russia’s main military procuracy, or prosecutorial office,
opened and investigated 1,500 criminal cases against Russian
soldiers serving in Chechnya. The procuracy convicted only 27
conscripts or kontraktniki (a soldier hired on contract by Russian
armed forces). Only six of the 27 convictions involved crimes
against the civilian population. 
There is no indication that this time Russian investigations will
be any more effective in bringing perpetrators to justice. United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson
stated, “Russian investigations into atrocities in Chechnya have
simply not been credible. The United Nations must seize the ini-
tiative here—not hand it back to Moscow.” The facts support the
High Commissioner’s argument. As reported in the Washington
Post, of the 2,121 crimes by the Russian military against Chechen
civilians, only 34 have gone to court. There has not been a sin-
gle prosecution for the three civilian massacres. 
Response of International Community 
During the 1994–1996 Chechen war, the international com-
munity repeatedly condemned the atrocities, but remained silent
when Russia failed to initiate investigations or punish perpetra-
tors of humanitarian crimes. The international community’s rel-
ative silence is a familiar response. Once again Russia has failed
to prevent, investigate, or punish perpetrators of humanitarian
crimes. Despite Russia’s failure to account for its atrocities, the
international community again has refrained from demanding
accountability. The only concrete measure signifying interna-
tional opposition to Russia’s actions in Chechnya occurred in April
2000, when the Council of Europe suspended the Russian dele-
gation’s right to vote.
On January 25, 2001, the Council of Europe restored Russia’s
voting rights, retreating from the semblance of a harsh stance
toward Russia. Advocacy organizations labeled the restoration of
voting rights a propaganda victory for Russia. In the week lead-
ing up to the vote, Putin announced a troop reduction and
approved a new structure for the Chechen civilian government.
Additionally, Putin transferred control of the offensive in
Chechnya from the military to the Federal Security Service, suc-
cessor to the KGB. A recent Washington Post editorial surmised this
shift meant the war will be “less conspicuous and even more
directly under Mr. Putin’s control.” Yet in spite of the skepticism
surrounding these recent offerings by Putin, the Council restored
Russia’s voting rights.
The West’s response to the Chechen war is contradictory.
During the war in Kosovo, British Prime Minister Tony Blair
remarked, “[t]he principle of non-interference [in other coun-
tries’ affairs] must be qualified in important respects. [War
crimes, acts of genocide and serious violations of human rights,]
can never be an internal matter.” Where Russian violations in
Chechnya are concerned, however, the international community
has failed to demonstrate the same resolve. As with the first war,
the international community’s passiveness enables Russia to con-
tinue its brutal campaign in Chechnya with impunity. 
International efforts to put an end to the atrocities have been
limited to non-binding resolutions. In April 2000, the European
Union sponsored a resolution condemning the atrocities in
Chechnya, which the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted
at its 56th session. Specifically, the resolution deplored human-
itarian law violations in Chechnya and called upon the Russian
government to immediately establish a national, broad-based
commission of inquiry and to investigate and prosecute, in full
compliance with international law, alleged violations of human
rights and breaches of humanitarian law. The resolution also
called on Russia to cooperate with intergovernmental and non-
governmental agencies seeking to conduct their own inquiries in
Chechnya and to grant immediate and unrestricted access to the
UN High Commission for Refugees and the International Com-
mittee for the Red Cross. Nearly a year later, Russia has refused
to implement the resolution’s key provisions. 
Possible Mechanisms for Demanding Accountability
Pursuing Accountability within the UN System 
In recent years, the UN Security Council created two ad hoc
international criminal tribunals—the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Additionally, there has
been discussion about creating ad hoc tribunals for East Timor,
Cambodia, and Sierra Leone. Although there is little movement
toward creating such a tribunal for Chechnya, a substantial body
of evidence exists documenting Russian atrocities, including
statements and field orders from Putin and military officials, the
ultimatum issued to the Grozny populace, reports of independent
press and NGOs, and witness testimony. Further, the establishment
of the ICTY and the ICTR set a precedent for judicial interven-
tion on the territory of a third party where war crimes and human
rights violations occur. 
Russia’s position on the UN Security Council effectively thwarts
international efforts to hold it accountable. To be precise, Rus-
sia’s veto power threatens to obstruct any legal mechanism within
the UN system. Just as Russia vehemently opposed the estab-
lishment of the ICTY, clearly it would oppose the establishment
of a tribunal for Chechnya.
Reluctance to deal harshly with Russia compromises the inter-
national commitment to protecting human rights and denigrates
the credibility of international bodies. As Holly Cartner of Human
Rights Watch stated, “If the UN tosses the ball back to the Rus-
sians, it will have abdicated its solemn responsibility to safeguard
human rights. If it [the UN Commission on Human Rights] fails
to launch its own investigation in Chechnya, it has foresworn its
most important duty.” The Council of Europe’s recent decision
to restore Russia’s voting rights most likely marks a retreat from
any attempts to sanction Moscow. 
A second option, advocated by NGOs, is the creation of an
international commission of inquiry. This commission would
investigate alleged violations of human rights and breaches of
humanitarian law to establish the truth and identity of those
responsible. A thorough and transparent investigation by the
UN would grant Western nations unprecedented access to Chech-
nya, including the “filtration camps.” Further, such a commission
would signal disapproval of Russia’s conduct in Chechnya. These
factors likely would deter at least some atrocities and save inno-
cent Chechen civilians. An international commission of inquiry
also would preserve a historical record, which would facilitate
future prosecutions. 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is another possible
forum for pursuing claims against Russia. Pursuant to Articles
36(1) and 40(1) of the ICJ Statute and Article 38 of the ICJ
Rules, formal charges have been filed with the ICJ against Pres-
ident Putin and other Russian leaders. Other potentially liable
parties include former president Boris Yeltsin, army commander
Viktor Kazantsev, armed forces Chief of Staff Anatoly Kvashnin,
and General Vladimir Chamanov. The ICJ lawsuit—Chechnya v.
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Russia—charges Putin and the Russian government with genocide
in violation of Russia’s obligations under the 1948 Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The
Chechen suit makes the following allegation of genocide: “[t]he
Russian Federation and the former Soviet Union have ruthlessly
implemented a systematic and comprehensive military, political
and economic campaign with the intent to destroy in substantial
part the national, ethnical, racial and religious group known as
the Chechen People.” An American lawyer, Francis Boyle, filed
the lawsuit on behalf of the Chechen government. Boyle previously
won a case for the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina against
Serbia and former Serb president Slobodan Milosevic. While
the lawsuit currently is pending, at the very least the ICJ should
grant Chechnya’s request for provisional measures, which are
detailed in its complaint. The Chechen government requested
the following provisional measures: the Russian government
should immediately take all measures to prevent commission of
the crime of genocide, and ensure that any military, paramilitary,
police or irregular armed units do not commit any acts of geno-
cide. Article 41 of the ICJ Statute justifies provisional measures
“where there is urgency in the sense that action prejudicial to the
rights of either party is likely” before a final decision is rendered. 
The European Court of Human Rights
Holding a permanent member of the UN Security Council
accountable for human rights and humanitarian law violations
within the UN system may be unattainable, thus requiring other
legal mechanisms. The European Court of Human Rights (Euro-
pean Court) is another possible venue for pursuing account-
ability. As a signatory to the European Convention, Russia is sub-
ject to the European Court’s jurisdiction. Chechens have begun
filing complaints with the European Court alleging violations of
their rights under the European Convention. The European
Court has agreed to hear numerous cases, including a complaint
involving the Staropromyslovski massacre. Through interviews with
survivors, Human Rights Watch compiled details about the mas-
sacre, in which nearly 40 civilians were summarily executed. In
another complaint, Sasita Khasuyeva, a Chechen nurse, has
brought a claim against the Russian government for the murder
of six patients and the forced disappearance of 61 other patients.
According to Khasuyeva’s claim, Russian troops attacked a hos-
pital convoy clearly marked with white flags.
Additionally, the United States might encourage its Euro-
pean allies to bring an inter-state complaint before the European
Court. The complaint would charge Russia with violating its
international treaty obligations. The guarantors of the Euro-
pean Convention could display tremendous resolve by launching
an interstate complaint. The European Union has long been a
proponent of humanitarian law. It supported the creation of
the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the ICTY, and
deployed monitors to document the atrocities in the former
Yugoslavia. United opposition to Russia would be fitting as Europe
celebrates the 50th anniversary of the European Convention. 
The only remaining question is whether a human rights court
can apply humanitarian law to determine whether there has
been a human rights violation. While this is an issue of first
impression for the European Court, the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights (IACHR) has dealt with this issue. In
the 1997 La Tablada case, the petitioners invoked various rules
of international humanitarian law to support their allegations that
state agents used excessive force and illegal means to recapture
the La Tablada military base. The IACHR determined it was “nec-
essary at times to apply directly rules of international humanitarian
law or to inform its interpretations of relevant provisions of the
American Convention [on Human Rights] by reference to these
rules.” The IACHR further noted that the American Convention
and humanitarian instruments share a “common nucleus of non-
derogable rights and a common purpose of protecting human
life and dignity.” During situations of internal armed conflict, the
Commission argued, these branches of international law converge
and reinforce each other. The IACHR’s findings certainly could
instruct the European Court’s determination of its competence
to adjudicate humanitarian law.
The ICC provides another potential forum for addressing
Chechen claims against Russia. Russia is a signatory, but has not
ratified the Rome Statute. Should the Rome Statute acquire the
requisite 60 ratifications, Chechen claims could be adjudicated
before the ICC.
Conclusion
It remains to be seen what course of action the international
community will choose to pursue accountability. Ensuring truth
and justice is necessary to building long-term peace in the region.
Whatever path it chooses, the international community must
insist on a credible, impartial, and transparent accountability
process. 
* Shara Abraham is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of Law
and a senior articles editor for the Human Rights Brief.
well-being of both present and future generations. The fact that
lawmakers have not adequately addressed these issues through
comprehensive and binding human rights instruments means
that policy makers will continue to be able to carry out unsound
super-infrastructure projects like the Three Gorges Dam in
non-participatory, repressive ways that result in the displacement
of millions, the endangerment of future generations through
massive habitat and species destruction, and the loss of cultural
heritage resources vital to understanding human history.
Although policy makers favoring large dam construction are
responding to the genuine needs of their citizens, large dams
clearly do not always offer the best available solution. Interna-
tional human rights law needs to provide better protection for
these emerging human rights threatened by dams so that pol-
icy makers can conduct balanced assessments of what truly is in
the public’s interest. 
* Sarah C. Aird is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of Law
and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.
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